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Abstract— Providing situational awareness in light of se-
vere coordinated cyber-attacks on power grids, where many
measurements may be untrusted, is necessary for reliable
monitoring and resilient operation of the grid. In this scenario,
the set of good measurements is by itself insufficient for
state estimation due to loss of observability. In this paper,
we present a resilient state estimation algorithm, based on
output clustering. By augmenting the measurement set by
respective cluster variables, the system observability is regained,
and a reliable state estimate can be computed. We show the
numerical performance of our proposed algorithm and its
ability to successfully replace corrupted measurements using
cluster variables through an example on the IEEE 24-bus power
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid has been increasingly exposed to
the public via smart devices with Internet connectivity and
operation of the grid through corporate networks and use
of more open control architectures. However, the evolution
of the power grid into a cyber-physical system (CPS) has
not been conducted with security in mind. In the recent
years, a number of cyber-incidents have demonstrated the
vulnerability of CPS, including the well-known attack on the
Ukrainian power grid in 2015 [1], and the cyber incident that
disrupted grid operation in the western US in March of 2019
[2]. These events have led to the increase in awareness of the
problem of securing critical infrastructure, such as the power
grid, transportation systems, gas and water networks, etc.
The control systems behind these critical infrastructures have
long been protected by physically isolating the local control
and communication networks from insecure global networks
such as the Internet. Since this physical separation is slowly
diminishing, and in the light of these new threats, many
attack detection schemes have been proposed in recent years,
both in the cyber (intrusion detection systems - IDSs) [3]–[5]
and the physical layers [6]–[8].
Further, the problem of state estimation (SE) in presence of
cyber-attacks has attracted a lot of attention, since a state es-
timate is crucial to continued operation of the critical infras-
tructures. For example, in power grids, the inability to pro-
duce a state estimate would cause the Energy Management
System (EMS) to be suspended. The resilient SE problem has
been formulated as robust SE, both with noiseless [9], [10]
and noisy measurements [11], [12], [13]. In [14], the authors
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propose a fusion framework that leverages the intrusion
detection from the cyber-layer, to exclude the compromised
measurements from SE, thus producing a reliable estimate.
However, these methods are limited by the observability
condition. In other words, in the scenario of a large-scale
coordinated attack, when many measurements may become
unavailable, the system will become unobservable, and it will
be impossible to produce a state estimate.
In this paper, we focus on the scenario of severe coor-
dinated cyber-attacks on measurements in power systems.
After detecting and localizing the cyber-attacks, too many
measurements are excluded from SE, and the system is no
longer observable. We propose a clustering-based method
for Resilient State Estimation, where the measurement set
is augmented, so that system observability is restored. We
define this method as resilient since it enables the system
operator to maintain situational awareness, and an acceptable
level of operational normalcy in response to disturbances
including threats of an unexpected and malicious nature [15].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II contains the mathematical formulation of the problem
considered in this paper. In Section III, we present the main
contribution of this paper, the Resilient State Estimation
method based on output clustering. Section IV introduces
relevant component models and demonstrates the efficiency
of our proposed method through a numerical example on the
IEEE RTS 24-bus power system. Finally, in Section V we
give some concluding remarks.
Notation: Let Ik denote a set of integers, and |Ik| its cardi-
nality. Then, enIk ∈ Rn×|Ik| is a matrix composed of column
vectors of the identity matrix In ∈ Rn×n corresponding to
the index set Ik. We use ‖M‖F to denote the Frobenius
norm of matrix M . Matrix M is said to be semistable iff
the zero eigenvalues of M are semisimple, and all the other
eigenvalues have a negative real part. Given a stable proper
transfer function of a dynamical system g(s), ‖g(s)‖H2 is
the H2-norm of the system.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we are concerned with enabling the Control
Center to compute a resilient state estimate in presence of
severe coordinated cyber-attacks on system measurements.
Figure 1 depicts the block diagram representation of the
system we consider.
A. System Description
The power system contains various components, such as
generators, loads, transmission lines, etc. We assume the
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of attacked power system. The signal
ya is injected into outputs y to manipulate the system.
physical system follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu˜(t) + d(t) (1)
where the states of system are denoted x ∈ Rn, d(t) denotes
a disturbance signal, and the control signal issued by the
Control Center (CC) is u˜ ∈ Rp.
A large network of field sensors is deployed to monitor
the operation of the power system in (1). A malicious
attacker can negatively impact the system by manipulating
the measurements, which is represented with the added signal
ya(t) in Figure 1:
y˜(t) = y(t) + (emA )
T ya(t) (2)
y(t) = Cx(t) (3)
where y˜ ∈ Rm are measurements received by the CC, and
ya ∈ Ra are a attack signals injected by an attacker. Thus, a
potentially manipulated measurement signal y˜ reaches the
CC, which can then issue a potentially incorrect control
signal u˜ to the power system actuators, u˜(t) = Kyˆ, where
yˆ = Cxˆ, and xˆ is the state estimate (e.g. from an observer
or other state estimation block). Finally, the attacked system
can be rewritten in closed-loop as:
Σa :
{
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bya(t) + d(t)
y˜(t) = Cx(t) + (emA )
T ya(t)
(4)
where A = A+BKC is the closed-loop system matrix, and
B = BK.
B. Resilient State Estimation Problem
Under normal conditions (no cyber-attack injected into the
system, u˜(t) = u(t)), a linear observer is designed for the
system in (4), to compute the state estimate xˆ(t) from the
received measurements:
˙ˆx(t) = Axˆ(t) + L(yˆ(t)− y(t))
= (A− LC)xˆ(t) + Ly(t)
yˆ(t) = Cxˆ(t)
(5)
In order to generate a state estimate xˆ, used for control
purposes, it is necessary and sufficient for the pair (A, C) to
be observable. This condition holds during normal operation
of power systems, even in presence of sensor failures, due to
redundancy in measurements. In other words, when such an
equipment failure occurs, the affected measurement is simply
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2: a) Example of cluster boundaries; xˆ2 is used instead
of x2I2 to produce a state estimate (similarly for other
clusters). b) Example of cluster boundaries for a larger
attack; parameter θ is used to ensure each cluster contains
at least one trusted measurement.
removed from state estimation, and the state estimate xˆ is
computed from the remaining (good) measurements. Similar
procedure can be applied in the event of a cyber-attack.
Assuming that attack detection and localization schemes
are in place (such as in [8], [16]), both in cyber and
physical layers, the attacked measurements can be removed
from state estimation. This implies that emA is known, and
that the measurement matrix C can be decomposed as
C =
[
C1 CA
]T
pi , where C1 ∈ R(m−a)×n corresponds
to trusted measurements, CA ∈ Ra×n to the attacked
measurements, and pi is a permutation matrix. Without loss
of generality, we assume that measurements are already
ordered in this fashion, i.e. pi = I . A state estimate can
then be produced if and only if (A, C1) is still observable.
However, during severe coordinated cyber-attacks, too many
measurements may be compromised. Thus, it will not be
possible to produce a state estimate.
In this paper, we address the problem of providing a state
estimate in the situation of severe coordinated cyber-attacks.
We do so by constructing a matrix CA, such that, with
an augmented matrix C =
[
C1 CA
]T
, the pair (A, C) is
observable, and a state estimate can be computed using the
augmented set of measurements
y¯ = Cx (6)
Using this definition, the error dynamics and residual for
the system in (5) using augmented measurements (6) can be
written as:
e˙(t) = (A− LC)xˆ(t)− (A− LC)x(t)− d(t) (7)
r(t) = yˆ(t)− y¯(t) (8)
The rest of this paper will address the construction of
matrix C based on clustering the system outputs. The aim
is to first aggregate measurements with similar dynamic
responses into clusters, where the aggregate behavior of each
cluster is a close approximation of the measurements within
it. Then, instead of each of the attacked measurements, the
aggregate behavior of the cluster it belongs to can be used
as a surrogate during the state estimation process (depicted
in Figure 2a). As the clustering-based aggregation is an
approximation procedure, the resulting state estimate will be
less accurate than if all the measurements were available,
but it is an important trade-off that must be made in order
to retain a necessary level of situational awareness during
severe cyber incidents. Therefore, this method is not intended
to replace the currently used state estimation methods, but
to supplement it during critical events.
III. CLUSTERING-BASED RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION
In this section, we introduce the clustering procedure on
the system Σ, and the construction of matrix CA based on
this clustering.
A. Measurement clustering procedure
Consider the system Σ in normal operation, in absence of
cyber-attacks (ya(t) ≡ 0):
Σ :
{
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + d(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(9)
To quantify the behavior of measurement signals, and the
aforementioned similarity between them, we first define
clusters Ik as disjoint subsets of L, where L = {1, . . . , l}
is the set of measurement indices. More specifically, clusters
are subsets of measurements that have a similar trajectories in
time domain. Measurements i, j belonging to the cluster Ik
are approximately proportional aiyi(t) ≈ ajyj(t) ≈ · · · ≈
z(k)(t), where ai, aj , . . . are constant coefficients. We aim
to estimate the full system state based on the combination
of received trusted measurements and the hidden system
structure contained in the clustered representation of the
system. With this intuition in mind, we aim to partition the
set L into clusters Ik such that
pjgi(s) = pigj(s), ∀i, j ∈ Ik (10)
where gi is the i-th element of g(s) = C(sIn − A)−1, a
transfer matrix of the system in (9). We can rewrite the
condition for cluster formation more compactly as
(enIk)
T g(s) = pTk g¯(s) (11)
where g¯(s) is a scalar function. This definition provides
intuition on the meaning of clustering in our application, but
is not practical for designing a procedure that would form
such clusters, which would require performing similarity
checks on functions. To get around this problem, we will
derive a matrix-based condition equivalent to (11), based
on the notion of observability. To that end, we first derive
the observability Gramian of a semistable system (9). The
observability Gramian is defined as [17]
Wo =
∫ ∞
0
eA
T tCTCeAtdt (12)
When A is Hurwitz, the above integral converges, and Wo
can also be found as a solution of the Lyapunov equation
ATWo + WoA + CTC = 0. However, in power systems,
the system matrix A has an inherent structural singularity,
as a direct consequence of power conservation law. Due to
semistability of the system matrix A, the integral in (12) may
not converge. Thus, we consider the decomposition of A =
UΛV −1, where U = [umax U¯ ] and V = [vmax V¯ ]T ,
and umax and vmax are the right and left eigenvectors
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue (λ1 = 0). Let A¯ =
V
TAU and C = CU , defined as the stable subspace of Σ.
Then, the observability Gramian of the semistable system is
Wo = U W oU
T
(13)
where W o is the observability Gramian associated with the
stable subspace (A¯, C) of Σ. In the following theorem we
find the condition equivalent to (11) using the observability
Gramian Wo of the semistable system Σ.
Theorem 1. Consider the observability Gramian Wo in
(13) of the semistable system Σ in (9). Furthermore, let the
Cholesky factorization of Wo be given by Wo = WLWTL ,
and Φ = WL. Then, the condition in (11) is equivalent to
(enIk)
TΦ = pTk φ¯ (14)
where φ¯ ∈ R1×n is a constant vector.
Proof. See Appendix.
However, in real systems, the identity in (11) is almost
never the case. Therefore, we relax the strict equality, and
require
‖pjgi(s)− pigj(s)‖H2 ≤ ε, ∀i, j ∈ Ik (15)
to hold for each cluster. Equivalently, we can check for linear
dependence between rows of matrix Φ:
‖pjΦi − piΦj‖ ≤ θ ∀i, j ∈ Ik (16)
where θ > 0 and Φi is the i-th row of Φ. Here, θ is a param-
eter that allows us to control the coarseness of clustering. In
other words, it allows us to find outputs that have a ”similar”,
instead of equal, response, which relaxes the condition (11).
However, the choice of θ is not trivial, as it introduces a
trade-off between accuracy of the approximation and size
of clusters. In general, θ should be chosen as a smallest
value for which each cluster contains at least one trusted
measurement (as depicted in Figure 2b).
B. Construction of matrix CA
After the clusters have been defined, we can construct the
matrix CA that will be used to augment the set of avail-
able trusted measurements so that the system is observable.
Then, the system operator can be provided with situational
awareness using the resilient state estimate. In the analysis
in previous section, we have shown that clusters can be
formed such that measurements i, j within the cluster Ik
are approximately proportional, i.e. aiyi(t) ≈ ajyj(t) ≈
· · · ≈ z(k)(t). Then, we derived a matrix-based condition
to find such clusters. Next, we show that the state estimate
can be produced using the augmented matrix C, by choosing
CA = (e
m
A )
TΠTΠC. The clustering matrix Π ∈ RK×n is
defined as:
Π := Diag{p1, p2, . . . , pK}E ∈ RK×n (17)
where E is a permutation matrix and pk are clustering
coefficients. The residual r = yˆ − y¯ defined in (8) will
converge to 0 if the error system gyˆ − gy¯ also converges to
0. The transfer matrix associated with yˆ is gyˆ(s) = gy(s) =
C(sI − A)−1, and the transfer matrix associated with y¯ is
gy¯(s) = Π
TΠC (sIn −A)−1. The following theorem estab-
lishes the convergence of the error system.
Theorem 2. Consider a semistable linear system in (9) and
the augmented set of measurements y¯ in (6). Then, the error
system ge(s) = gyˆ(s) − gy¯(s) is asymptotically stable, and
state x can be estimated using measurements y¯.
Proof. See Appendix.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We begin this section by providing necessary power sys-
tem component models, and deriving the standard state space
model of the interconnected power system in form given in
(9). Then, we demonstrate the performance of our method
on the IEEE RTS 24-bus system.
A. Power system modeling
In this section, we introduce the power system component
models used to derive the system matrices in (9). We model
the loads as dynamic using the structure-preserving load
model, alongside the generator model with governor control.
We consider a power system with nG generators and nL
loads, and denote the set of generator buses by G, and the set
of load buses by L. The mechanical dynamics of generators
with governor control and aggregate loads at the substation
level are given by:
Jiω˙i +Diωi = PT,i − Pi + eT,iai, i ∈ G
Jiω˙i +Diωi = −Pi − Li, i ∈ L
Tu,iP˙T,i = −PT,i +Kt,iai, i ∈ G
Tg,ia˙i = −riai − (ωi − ωref ), i ∈ G
(18)
For each bus i, state variable ωi denotes its frequency, Pi
the net real power injected into the network, and states PT,i
and ai denote the mechanical power of the generator and the
turbine valve position. At load buses i ∈ L, Li is defined
as actual mechanical power consumed by the load. ωref is
the frequency reference provided by the higher control layer.
In order to derive the interconnected system, we treat Pi as
a coupling state variable whose dynamics can be obtained
by differentiating the linearized DC power flow equation,
expressed in matrix form as:[
P˙G
−P˙L
]
= Ybusω , where Ybus =
[
YGG YGL
YLG YLL
]
(19)
where PG := [Pi]i∈G and PL := [Pi]i∈L, and Ybus is the
admittance matrix of a lossless transmission network.
In the following section, we present numerical simulation
examples performed on the IEEE RTS 24-bus power system
to illustrate the performance of our proposed resilient SE
method.
B. Test system and illustrative scenarios
The IEEE RTS 24-bus system [18] consists of 10 gen-
erators, equipped with governor control, and 14 loads. The
interconnected system is modeled using equations (18)-(19),
where the dimension of x is 68. In Figure 3, we analyze the
system in the following scenario. From t = 0 to 20 s, the
loading is nominal. At time t = 20 s, load at bus 3 increases
by 0.1 p.u., and at time t = 200 loading returns to nominal
value.
Under this scenario, we plot the trajectories of measure-
ments (solid lines) within two clusters, one containing fre-
quency, and one containing power measurements. In Figures
3a and 3b, we plot in dotted line the cluster variable, i.e. the
surrogate to be used in place of any measurement within the
cluster in case of a cyber-attack. In both cases, the cluster
variable resembles a centroid of the measurements within it,
and can be used for resilient state estimation. In Figure 3c,
we demonstrate the accuracy of state estimation using cluster
variables. Specifically, we compare the approximation error
introduced by clustering, depending on the number of clus-
ters that are formed. Recall that clusters are disjoint subsets
of measurements, i.e. large number of clusters means that the
clusters are very small in size, and vice versa. Figures 3a and
3b present the scenario where measurements were clustered
into 21 clusters, which resulted in approximation error of
∼ 7%. This choice allows for larger clusters, containing
more than one measurement, while maintaining accuracy
of approximation and, therefore, suitable for our proposed
resilient state estimation method.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a resilient state estimation
algorithm, based on dynamic clustering, which maintains
situational awareness during severe coordinated cyber-attacks
on system measurements. The set of good measurements,
itself insufficient for state estimation, was augmented by
respective cluster variables, to provide a reliable state es-
timate in critical situations. We numerically showed the
performance of our proposed algorithm and its ability to
successfully replace corrupted measurements using cluster
variables through an example on the IEEE 24-bus power
system.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. In order for (11) to hold, for each
i, j ∈ Ik it must hold that pj‖gi(s)‖H2 = pi‖gj(s)‖H2 .
Similarly, (14) is equivalent to pj‖Φi‖ = pi‖Φj‖, where Φi
is the ith row of the matrix Φ. The H2-norm of a linear
system can be computed as the L2-norm of its impulse
response h(t).
‖g(s)‖2H2 = ‖h(t)‖22 = tr
{
U
[∫ ∞
0
eA¯
T tC
T
CeA¯tdt
]
U
T
}
(a) Cluster of frequency measurements (b) Cluster of power measurements
(c) Approximation error
for different size clusters
Fig. 3: Two examples of clusters in the IEEE RTS 24-bus system. In (a) and (b), solid lines are real measurements, red
dotted line is the approximated cluster measurement to be used as surrogate in case of a cyber-attack. Table in (c) compares
the approximation error depending on the number of clusters that are formed.
For ‖h(t)‖22 to be finite, the integral above must be finite.
Since A¯ and C are the stable subspace of Σ, we have
lim
t→∞ e
A¯t = 0. Therefore, ‖h(t)‖22 is finite and equal to:
‖g(s)‖2H2 = ‖h(t)‖22 = tr{Wo} = tr{WLWTL } =
= ‖WL‖F = ‖Φ‖F
where ‖ · ‖F is a vector norm applied to each row of Φ.
Hence, (11) is equivalent to (14).
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition, Π is a unitary matrix.
Also, by definition, vmax ∈ colspace(ΠT ). Let Π¯ be an
orthogonal complement of Π. Therefore, I −ΠTΠ = Π¯T Π¯.
Consider now the error system ge:
ge(s) = C(sI −A)−1 −ΠTΠC(sI −A)−1 =
= (In −ΠTΠ)C(sI −A)−1 = Π¯T Π¯g(s)
(20)
We have ΠTΠvmax = vmax, or equivalently Π¯vmax = 0.
This implies that there is pole-zero cancellation in Π¯g(s)
associated with the zero eigenvalue. Therefore, all poles of
Π¯g(s) have negative real parts, and the error system ge is
asymptotically stable.
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